Although no drones or missiles have been heard in Kyiv recently, russia and Ukraine have been actively exchanging drone airstrikes. Notable is the increase in strikes on russian oil refining facilities.
https://babel.ua/news/120555-stali-vidomi-podrobici-zustrichi-trampa-i-putina-na-alyasciAlso Ukrainian drones attacked an oil pumping station of the Transneft Druzhba oil pipeline in the Bryansk region.
https://www.unian.ua/war/udari-po-rf-droni-urazili-naybilshiy-vuzol-naftoprovodu-druzhba-13096314.html?utm_source=ukrnet_newsrussia plans to produce 79,000 Shahed drones in 2025, including various modifications such as Geran-2, Harpy-1, Gerbera, and others. Production will take place on additional lines in Izhevsk and Yelabuga with an emphasis on replacing imported parts with domestic production, said the Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Major General Vadim Skibitsky.
The production of unmanned aerial vehicles, the preservation and expansion of production, primarily of Iskander ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, now allows the russian Federation to carry out combined strikes. First, various types of unmanned aerial vehicles are used, then either cruise or ballistic missiles. Sometimes ballistic missiles are used separately specifically against critical infrastructure facilities or against our armed formations, which involve a very quick strike and at a specific location. The main targets are air defense, aviation, critical infrastructure, and recently again the energy system.
One of the strengths of the russian Federation's armed forces is that they have operational reserves. They use them for rotations, reinforcements in the most critical areas of the front. And, accordingly, to replenish losses on the battlefield. The staffing of the armed forces of the russian Federation is quite high. For example, all the groups of troops are staffed by 98 percent with officers. In general, russia fulfills its recruitment plans every month by at least 105-110 percent. To date, about 67 percent of the 343 thousand that they planned to recruit for this year have already been fulfilled. And there is preliminary data that they have already decided to increase this figure by at least 15-17 percent. In general, today they have no problems with recruiting. They have a powerful social package, large payments just for signing the first contract. They announced partial mobilization only once - in the fall of 2022 and recruited 300 thousand. The rest are recruited without mobilization. That is, people go, they are also lured by benefits - for example, free education of children in higher educational institutions, attractive mortgage terms, etc. And, importantly, families in the russian Federation support this.
https://suspilne.media/1089054-akso-putin-dast-komandu-pocnetsa-peregovornij-proces-skibickij-iz-gur-pro-plani-rosian-ta-ihnij-zapas-micnosti/On August 12, at a meeting with journalists, President Volodymyr Zelensky for the first time announced the exact losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine per day - including wounded, dead and missing. According to the president, the number of russian soldiers at the front is three times greater than that of Ukrainians - the enemy suffers approximately the same number of losses. Zelensky said that on August 11, 2025, the russians lost 968 people. Among them, 531 were killed, 428 were wounded, and 9 were captured. At the same time, Ukrainian forces, according to him, lost 340 soldiers: 18 were killed, 243 were wounded, and 79 were missing.
https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c3r4vy5gvx2oIn the first year of the full-scale russian invasion, the Defense Forces repeatedly outmaneuvered the clumsy russian army, relying on improvisation and the determination of soldiers on the ground. But within three years, the Ukrainian military has returned to a more rigid and vertical system of warfare that dates back to Soviet times, writes The Wall Street Journal. Officers and soldiers complain about a centralized command culture that often punishes initiative and leads to unnecessary casualties. Generals order frontal assaults with a slim chance of success and refuse soldiers who ask for a tactical retreat to save their men. The russian army suffers from much greater problems, because its command treats its men as disposable material. russia has advanced for two years at great cost. But Ukraine cannot make up for its losses as easily as russia.
https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-russia-army-soviet-5fa8e1c9?mod=europe_trendingnow_article_pos5The Telegraph is trying to find out why divided Ukrainians are refusing to fight for Zelensky. russian gains in the east are undermining morale while casting Kyiv’s manpower problems in stark relief.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/08/14/why-divided-ukrainians-are-refusing-to-fight-for-zelensky/You can look for reasons for this, but I'm simply stating a fact - it is impossible to defeat the russian army with such an approach, and I don't want to think that this is precisely the goal of the Ukrainian high command. Otherwise, we have to admit that it is insane, continuing to do the same thing without changing anything.
Although certain changes do occur from time to time, but they usually concern the worsening of the situation of ordinary Ukrainians.The Cabinet of Ministers approved a bill proposing to introduce fines for violating curfew.
https://komersant.ua/uriad-hotuie-pokarannia-za-porushennia-komendantskoi-hodyny-detali/War and a new life abroad are changing the plans of millions of Ukrainians. The National Bank, in its July Inflation Report, states that the mass return of migrants home is being postponed for several more years. According to updated calculations, a net outflow of about 200,000 people is expected in 2025 and 2026. Previously, it was predicted that population growth would begin as early as 2026. A prolonged outflow of population will create a labor shortage, which will slow down the economic recovery and push up wage growth. This, in turn, will increase inflationary pressure.
https://bank.gov.ua/admin_uploads/article/IR_2025-Q3.pdf?v=14
